[pt. 1] Gerald Heard's psychological approach to the problem of the nature of history. (Reprinted from Social science, v. 15, no. 3, July, 1940)--[pt. 2] Troeltsch's theory of history. (Reprinted from the Personalist, v. 28, no. 1, 1947.

The distinguished American civil rights leader, W. E. B. Du Bois first published these fiery essays, sketches, and poems individually nearly 80 years ago in the Atlantic, the Journal of Race Development, and other periodicals. This volume has long inspired readers with its militant cry for social, political, and economic reforms for black Americans.

The contents include chapters covering: theory of command; theory of sovereignty; evidence of law; theory of legal duty theory of legal sanctions; theory of the legal object; theory of imputation; theory of legal rights; rights related to ownership; foreign rights; codification of the law; & others.

Recent critiques have selected textual evidence for casting Hearne as a failed narrator, because he did not live up to the mercantile or imperialist expectations for late 18th-century explorers, or as a biased narrator, because he never fully moves beyond such valuations. But if we categorize phenomenologically Hearne's experiences as a student of the Arctic throughout his four-year journey, there is more textual evidence for reading it as the account of a civilized narrator's conflicted adaptation to an indigenous society as (...) his consciousness is more and more shaped by Arctic nature. Hearne's A Journey from Prince of Wales's Fort in Hudson's Bay, to the Northern Ocean 1769, 1770, 1771, 1772 (1795) is filled with patterns of experience in which Hearne is learning, often slowly and painfully, a culture of place through his body. Hearne is a developing narrator who moves from experiencing the Arctic as an alien, hostile, and unnatural place to responding directly to its actualities, adjusting over time to the demands the land and its people place on him. As Hearne eventually finds a temporary home in Arctic wilderness, his most significant accomplishment as a narrator is to move the locus of culture into it. As the phenomenologist Edward S. Casey puts it, this results in a 'thickening' between the antinomical oppositions of civilization and Arctic. Viewed in light of his own statements in his Preface, the commendation of contemporary reviewers, and the contrasting limitations of pre-Hearne sub-Arctic narratives, Hearne's Journey amounts to a reconfiguration of 18th-century civilized constructs into three roles grounded in Arctic phenomena: as a naturalist, as a traveler across northern terrain, and as a member of a Chipewyan war party. An ur-narrative of land-based Arctic exploration, Hearne's Journey finally demonstrates an integration with the land and the Chipewyans with whom he travels that establishes phenomenological precedents for the reading of all later accounts of land-based Arctic travel. (shrink)

This 2 part book, originally published in 1890, was written to help students of morals comprehend the significance of morals. The questions with which an historian of morals is chiefly concerned are the changes that have taken place in the moral standard and in the moral type, the degrees in which, in different ages, recognised virtues have been enjoined and practiced and the relative importance that in different ages has been attached to different virtues.

This chapter contains section titled: Hume's Theory of Belief Normativity Notes References Further reading.

Although Hume has no developed semantic theory, in the heyday of analytic philosophy he was criticized for his “meaning empiricism,” which supposedly committed him to a private world of ideas, led him to champion a genetic account of meaning instead of an analytic one, and confused “impressions” with “perceptions of an objective realm.” But another look at Hume’s “meaning empiricism” reveals that his criterion for cognitive content, the cornerstone both of his resolutely anti-metaphysical stance and his naturalistic “science of human (...) nature,” provides the basis for a successful response to his critics. Central to his program for reforming philosophy, Hume’s use of the criterion has two distinct aspects: a critical or negative aspect, which assesses the content of the central notions of metaphysical theories to demonstrate their unintelligibility; and a constructive or positive aspect, which accurately determines the cognitive content of terms and ideas. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: The Problem of Induction: Hume's Problem The Regularity Theory of Causation Hume and Cognitive Science Hume and Naturalized Epistemology Hume as anti‐Metaphysician References Further Reading.

This book is a fresh study of the fourth century B.C. Greek adventurer, writer, and student of Socrates, Xenophon. An innovating author of many guises, an important source for the history of his time, a wit and a philosopher, he no longer enjoys the reputation he once did. Suggesting that such a radical de-valuation is more a reflection on nineteenth- and twentieth-century attitudes and scholarship than on the worth of Xenophon, the author in this book attempts to reassert Xenophon’s rightful (...) position by offering a close, literary-historical reading of all of Xenophon’s writings and by focusing in this process on the alluring reticence and ironic subtlety many have often failed to appreciate before offering what turn out to be their too hasty criticisms. It is hoped that this study will help to bring about the realization that Xenophon, when properly read and read without preconceptions, may yet prove an invaluable guide to the development of Greek thought in general and the world of fourth-century Greece in particular. Xenophon emerges as one of the last great representatives of that civilization which reached its height in Athens, and it is in this context that he is best understood, not, as so often previously, against the Peloponnesian and especially Spartan background where he had friends and where he spent a long exile. (shrink)

David Owen’s new book invites us to take a fresh look at three major modern philosophers: Descartes, Locke, and Hume. Although Leibniz invented the familiar conception of proof as a formal relationship among sentences, reasoning for these three philosophers was a very different animal: they thought of it as a matter, not of form, but of content. They regarded proof—demonstration or demonstrative reasoning—as a process of stringing together chains of relations between ideas. That process appeals to the content of the (...) ideas involved, and is thus a radically non-formal conception of reasoning, one that has as little to do with the syllogisms of Aristotle and the Scholastics as it does with the post-Fregean notion of deductive validity dominant today. (shrink)

This bibliography covers the Hume literature for 2000. I am grateful to all those who contributed additions or corrections to previous bibliographies, and I again encourage readers of Hume Studies to supply additions, corrections, or bibliographical information still missing from any of these listings.

This bibliography covers the Hume literature for 2003. Once again, I encourage readers of Hume Studies to supply additions, corrections, or bibliographical information still missing from any previous listings. I am grateful to all who have contributed additions or corrections to previous bibliographies, and again thank Frédéric Brahami for his help with this year’s French Hume literature.

This bibliography covers the Hume literature for 2001. I am grateful to all those who contributed additions or corrections to previous bibliographies, and I again encourage readers of Hume Studies to supply additions, corrections, or bibliographical information still missing from any of these listings.

David Hume is widely regarded as the greatest English thinker in the history of philosophy. His contributions to a huge range of philosophical debates are as important and influential now as they were in the eighteenth century. This book provides an introduction to the ideas of this hugely significant thinker.

Pickering and Chater (P&C) maintain that folk psychology and cognitive science should neither compete nor cooperate. Each is an independent enterprise, with a distinct subject matter and characteristic modes of explanation. P&C''s case depends upon their characterizations of cognitive science and folk psychology. We question the basis for their characterizations, challenge both the coherence and the individual adequacy of their contrasts between the two, and show that they waver in their views about the scope of each. We conclude that P&C (...) do not so muchdiscover ascreate the gap they find between folk psychology and cognitive science. It is an artifact of their implausible and unmotivated attempt to demarcate the two areas, and of the excessively narrow accounts they give of each. (shrink)

Treatise on political power, statecraft, and the qualities of the ideal ruler.